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Achieving equity in health through community based health 
insurance: India’s experience with a large CBHI programme 
Abstract: This paper analyses equity in one of the largest community based health insurance 
programme in India: Yeshasvini, run by the Department of Cooperation in Karnataka, a state 
in India. The analysis is based on a primary survey of 4109 households in rural Karnataka. 
The study covers various dimensions of vulnerability and assesses their relationship with 
enrolment, renewal of enrolment, and utilisation of health care services using logistic 
regression techniques. The results demonstrate that inequities do exist. However, they are less 
pronounced in the distribution of benefits than in enrolment and renewals. The study argues 
that while CBHI may be used as a mechanism to reach the most disadvantaged population 
groups, they can not be considered as substitute for government created health infrastructure. 
 
1. The study 
 
The new international thinking on health that emerged during the late 1990s underlines the 
notion that the governments in developing countries should promote and strengthen 
community based health insrance (CBHI) schemes
1 as a viable option in providing financial 
protection to the poor (WHO 2000, 2001)
2. As a result, governments in many developing 
countries have taken initiatives to strengthen these schemes as part of their health policy. This 
has led to proliferation of these programmes across developing countries (ILO 2005, Tabor 
2006 for survey). There is evidence albeir weak that such schemes help to improve financial 
access, utilisation, and quality of health care services through cooperative and community 
efforts (See, e.g. Aggarwal 2010 for a recent study). However, there is a gap in knowledge in 
determining how equitable such schemes are. While examining the issue of equity, most 
studies focus on the socio economic composition of the current members of these schemes. 
Generally it is believed that for equity reasons, membership should not be biased towards the 
                                                           
1 CBHI schemes are known by different names in different parts of the world, including: micro-
insurance, community health finance organisations, mutual health insurance schemes, pre-payment 
insurance organisations, voluntary informal sector health insurance, mutual health 
organisations/associations, community health finance organisations, and community self-financing 
health organisations. 
 
2 The Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (WHO, 2001), for example, recommended that, 
“out-of-pocket expenditures by poor communities should increasingly be channeled into community 
financing schemes to help cover the costs of community-based health delivery”(p 60).   3
better off and be effectively open to economically vulnerable groups. Thus, most studies have 
linked equity with income or wealth. However, equity aspects of a programme cannot be 
assessed in terms of its ability to address economic vulnerability alone. In the recent 
literature, multi dimensional measures of vulnerability are emerging. In a broader sense, 
vulnerability is defined (Schmidt-Thomé and Jarva, 2003) as a set of conditions and 
processes resulting from physical, social, economic, locational and environmental factors, 
which determine the susceptibility of an individual/community to the impact of catastrophic 
events (deterioration of health in the present context). In the existing literature on equity in 
micro health insurance, however, vulnerability arising out of economic factors occupies a 
central place while other dimensions of vulnerabilities are relatively overlooked. Further, 
most studies have focused on the composition of current members by economc category; a 
few have examined the characteristics of those who have been renewing registration or have 
actually been the claimants of the benefits. The present study addresses these gaps in the 
literature. The main aim of the study is to examine, using a broad based concept of 
vulnerability, equity in enrolment, renewal of membership, and utilisation of services in the 
context of one of the largest CBHI programmes in India: Yeshasvini Health Care programme. 
The programme offers the rural poor an opportunity of taking benefits of advanced and 
highly expensive surgical treatments which otherwise would be non accessible to them. This 
study examines whether the programme reaches out to the most vulnerable sections of the 
rural poor. The multi-dimensional concept of vulnerability used in the study covers: 
  social vulnerability,   
  gender-specific vulnerability, 
  health vunerability, 
  economic vulnerability, and  
  location specific vulnerability   4
 
The rest of the study is planned as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical discussion on 
equity dimensions of CBHI. Section 3 focuses on the Yeshasvini programme. It describes the 
core characteristics of the programme and discusses their implications for equity. Section 4 
provides a theoretical framework which Section 5 describes the research designs and database. 
Section 6 discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section 7 concludes the analysis. 
 
2. CBHI and health equity: Theoretical discussion 
 
The theoretical explanations for the success of CBHI are set within the fold of the social 
capital framework (Atim, 1999, Jakab and Preker 2001, Dror and Preker 2002, Criel and 
Waelkens, 2003, Dror and Preker, 2002, 2004, Hsiao, 2001, Jowett, 2003, 2008, Kiwanuka-
Mukiibi et al.2005, Meessen et al, 2002, Ron, 1999, Schneider, 2004, Zhang et al., 2006)
3. 
Low-income households are generally benefited by informal risk protection through family 
and relatives, community links, institutional links or societal links. These social and 
community links, if institutionalised through insurance programmes, may serve as social 
capital and can effectively play an important role in promoting social welfare (Dror and 
Preker 2002, p. 48). Social connections as well as trust and local community control over 
these prorammes overcome the informational disadvantages and high transaction costs 
involved in providing insurance to low income population. This in turn improves willingness 
to pay even by the poorest of the poor. Further, communities are set within highly different 
economic, cultural, demographic, political and epidemiological contexts. One major 
advantage of micro- insurance is that their technical designs are heavily influenced by these 
factors. This offers considerable flexibility to the parties negotiating a contract, reducing 
                                                           
3 Mladovsky and Mossialos (2008) however use the social capital framework to argue how the  same 
factors may affect the growth of CBHI adversely.    5
transaction costs and scaling up participation (Churchill 2006). Thus, social bonding, 
solidarity, trust, intra- and extra-community networks, vertical civil society links and state-
society relations at the local level are important factors in explaining the success of the CBHI 
in reaching out to the poorest. Theoretically, therefore, CHI schemes may be an effective 
mechanism for ensuring
 equitable distribution of health protection among the rural population 
in the resource-poor settings where governments have limited financial and institutional 
capacity. 
 
The above arguments notwithstanding, evidence indicates that there have been wide 
variations in the performance of these schemes. Some CBHIs have played a useful risk 
protection role and complemented public health care efforts (see, Tabor 2006 among others) 
by extending social protection to the most vulnerable sections that would otherwise have no 
financial protection against the cost of illness. But, many others have failed. In their review of 
literature on equity, Preker et al (2002) and Jakab and Krishnan (2004) find that while CBHI 
is effective in reaching the low income group people, the poorest and socially excluded 
groups are not automatically included. This exclusion effect is observed by Ekman (2004) 
also. The most important reason turns out to be the poor ability to pay followed by the 
distance from the providers. Using cluster randomised controlled trial over 2003-05, Ranson 
et al (2007) evaluated the impact of after-sales-service with supportive supervision
  and 
prospective reimbursement on the
 uptake of benefits of a community based health insurance 
scheme (SEWA) in India by its poorest members. However, time and information 
dissemination measures were not found to be sufficient to ensure the poorer members a
 
greater share of the scheme benefits. In contrast, Onwujekwe et al. (2009) and Polonsky et al 
(2009) found strong evidence of equity in CBHI schemes in Nigeria and Armenia, 
respectively. While analysing equity dimensions of two CBHI programmes in Nigeria,   6
Onwujekwe et al. (2009) suggested that there was no inequity in enrolment, willingness to 
renew registration and utilisation of services. The analysis was based on the data collected 
using a questionnaire that was administered to 971 respondents in two communities, selected 
by simple random sampling. Polonsky (2009) evaluates equity of Oxfam's CBHI schemes in 
rural  Armenia. Members of a random sample of 506 households in villages  operating 
insurance schemes in rural Armenia were interviewed  using a structured questionnaire. 
Logistic and Poisson regression analyses were performed  to identify the determinants of 
health facility utilisation across socio-economic strata. Its findings demonstrate that the 
distribution of  benefits among members of this community-financing scheme 
is  equitable.  Apparently, the equity effects of CBHI scheme are expected to vary across 
countries, and CBHI types and designs; and are subject to empirical analysis. In a qualitative 
investigation of demand for health insurance in rural West Africa, De Allegri et al (2006) 
suggest that the success of a CBHI programme largely depends on its technical design.  The 
present study thus focuses on the “Yeshasvini” health care programme in India and analyses 
its equity dimensions. 
 




The scheme was introduced in June 2003 in “Karnataka”, an Indian state by the Department 
of Cooperation (DOC) to provide insurance cover to members of cooperative societies in 
rural Karnataka (Kuruvilla 2005, Radermacher et al 2005, and ILO 2006). While the 
programme is being run under the auspices of a government department, it is governed by an 
independent charitable trust: “Yeshasvini Cooperative Farmers’ Health Care Trust”. The   7
Trust consists of 12 members and is chaired by the Principal Secretary of the Department for 
Cooperation. Other members include employees of the Karnataka Department of 
Cooperation; health professionals representing network hospitals; and the Director of the 
Health Department
4.  The Trust has hired “Family Health Plan Limited” (FHPL), a TPA
5 
registered with “Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority” to administer the 
scheme.  The vast administrative infrastructure of the DOC has facilitated the collection of 
revenue at no additional cost. Its involvement ensures government backing of the scheme and 
proves to be an important trust building factor for the programme. Further, access to the 
cooperative network assists the managers of the programme in mobilising membership and 
implementing the scheme at the grassroots level with the help of cooperative societies. 
Cooperative societies organise farmers and other informal sector workers in rural areas in an 
institutional framework and act as a communication channel between the government and the 
rural population. There were a total number of 32900 Co-operative societies in Karnataka in 
2007. Of them, 28099 co-operatives were actively working. These societies not only mobilise 
membership but also extend help to members in seeking treatment from network hospitals.  
 
The designated health care providers in the scheme are mainly private hospitals, although 
charitable, public sector and cooperative sector hospitals are also participating in the scheme. 
Some are super specialty hospitals. In 2008-09, the number of network hospitals was 349. 
These were spread across 27 districts. The Trust has fixed a price for each surgery, including 
nearly all connected costs. An important feature of the programme is that the price for 
surgery paid to a network hospital is significantly below the normal market charges and a 
well specified list of exclusions is provided to all the hospitals.  
                                                           
4 Included as the 12
th trustee in November 2005. 
5 Third Party Administrators (TPAs) are for-profit-companies that assume most of the administration 
of an insurance scheme in exchange for a commission. The TPA’s main duty is to manage the contact 
between the client, the health care provider and the insurance scheme.   8
 
Thus, the Trust is benefited by the government administrative machinery, provisions of 





Low contribution: The premium was fixed at Rs 120 per year per person. Recently, it has 
been raised to Rs 130. A rebate of 15 % is offered on contribution for families of five or more 
members. 
 
Long enrolment schedules: Enrolment schedules are extended to 5 months namely, January to 
May. These months are also the harvesting time of cash crops such as cotton and sugarcane 
which make it easier for farmers to make the payment.  
 
Flexible mode of payment: The mode of payment is not fixed either. It is decided by the local 
cooperative societies depending on the local conditions. Some societies accept monthly 
payments during the enrolment period while others demand lump sum payment. Recognising 
that the subscription may be financial obstacle to membership, some societies accept 
bimonthly payment also. Credit cooperative societies generally deduct the subscription 
amount with the consent of the member while lending money.  
 
Attractive sevice package: The benefit package is well defined and well designed focusing on 
high cost surgery events that could be catastrophic for the poor households. Free OPD 
consultations and diagnostic lab tests at concessional rates are optional. The maximum   9
coverage per person per year amounts to Rs. 200,000 with free OPD. The benefits are 
reviewed from time to time and appropriate changes are introduced in the package depending 
on the demand. For instance, recently, normal deliveries and emergencies such as snake bite, 
bull gore and dog bites are also included in the package, keeping in view the growing demand 
for such coverage.  
 
Cashless transactions: An important feature of this scheme is that the procedures are 
minimised and transactions are cashless. Paients are not involved in any administrative 
process.  
 
Enrolment process for network hospitals: A hospital willing to join the Network can apply if 
it has 25 or more beds. It is given a self assessment form to assess itself. Each medical facility 
provided by the hospital is assigned specific marks in this form. A minimum of 88 marks is to 
be scored to be part of the network. Hospitals claims are verified through inspections by the 
Trust before making the final decision of its enrolment. 
 
Monitoring of network hospitals:  The FHPL undertakes regular inspections of network- 
hospitals to monitor the quality of their services, and to ensure that the latter remain adhered 
to their commitments made to the Trust. If they are found defaulting, strict actions are taken 
against them including permanent ban on their yeshasvini membership.  
 
Financial sustainability: At the current level of premium, financial sustainability is not 
achievable even with a vast membership base. This is because it covers high end medical 
treatment. In order to augment its resources, the Trust welcomes donations from private and 
government bodies. It has also been decided to collect 3 percent of the profits from the   10
profitable societies as donations. Furthermore, the management has created a contingency 
fund which is invested in interest yielding assets to earn interest income. Finally, the scheme 
receives government subsidy. A part of this is added to the contingency fund. The capacity of 
managers to manage funds has thus ensured the financial sustainability of the scheme.  
 
Achievements 
Large membership base: Yeshasvini Health insurance programme has effectively created a 
large membership base. In the first year of the scheme itself 1.6 million cooperative members 
enrolled with the scheme. In 2008-09, enrolment increased to 3.0 million which marked 29.3 
percent increase over the increased base of the last year.  
Broad based use of services: There has been a rapid increase in the number of surgery cases. 
In absolute terms, in 2007-08, a total number of 60,668 surgeries took place. In 2009, during 
April-October alone 23,883 sureries had been perromed under the programme. A wide range 
of surgical processes are being offered by the scheme. Heart, gynae, general, Uro, Optho, 
ENT and Ortho surgeries accounted for 85 percent of the total surgeries performed over the 
period of three years, 2003-04 to 2006-07. Heart surgeries accounted for almost 20 percent of 
total surgeries followed by general and OBG surgeries.  
Spatial dispersion of service providers: There has been a considerable change in the 
distribution of beneficiaries by location within a short span of time (Table 1). In 2004-05, 
five of the 27 districts: Mandya, Kolar, Hassan, Bangalore and Davangere accounted for 
almost half the beneficiaries. The level of concentration declined sharply within the next two 
years. The HH index of concentration of claimants was 670 in 2004-05, it fell to 323.3 in 
2006-07.    11
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
In 2004-05, 148 hospitals registered 17,407 surgeries under Yeshasvini. Of this, 1700 (9.81 
percent) were performed in Narayana Hrudayala hospital alone. In 2006-07, 290 hospitals 
registered Yeshasvini patients and the HH ratio declined from 254 (in 2004-05) to 230. 
Spatial distribution of hospitals performing surgeries under the programme also showed a 
remarkable change. In 2006-07, hospitals across 79 cities participated in the process and the 
HH index declined steeply.   
In nutshell, the programme has developed mechanisms to tap the government for its vast 
administrative machinery to mobilise members and monitor the scheme without creating 
additional administrative infrastructure; the private sector for quality health care services; and 
the cooperative sector networks for the societal capital generated over the years through 
business linkages between these societies and their members. The synergy developed at 
various levels is directed to finance high cost medical treatment of the poor who otherwise 
have no health security provided by the State. It is designed and managed by professionals 
who have developed well specified procedures for enrolment, networking of hospitals, 
treatment and claim settlement. There are mechanisms to monitor the operations of various 
actors and punish the defaulters. As a result, Yeshasvini Health insurance programme has 
effectively created a large membership base and has successfully been providing services 
across the state. The fixed rates of surgery, tight monitoring and the possibility of punitive 
actions discourage over-utilisation of health care services, both on the demand and supply 
side. The institutional, organisational and technical features of the programme, and its 
success in creating a wide membership and effective service provisions are expected to 
ensure that the scheme is equitable.  
   12
4. Determinants of enrolement, renewals and claims:  Theoretical Model 
 
People purchase health insurance if the utility of the expected benefits of coverage, in the form of 
expected covered expenditures plus the value of protection from financial risk, exceed the 
premium. Algebraically, let UN be the utility from not obtaining insurance, such that  
 
UN = UN (YN, M; Tw) + eN 
 
where, YN is income in the uninsured state, M are out-of-pocket medical expenses when 
uninsured (assumed to be zero when insured), Tw is a shift variable capturing the addition to 
utility from non-participation for individuals with weak preferences for coverage, and eN is a 
stochastic error term. Similarly, let Ui be the utility from insurance 
 
UI= UI(YI,P; Ts) + eI 
 
 It depends upon income in the insured state,  premium P, a shift factor, Ts, accounting for the 
gain in utility from enrolling in health insurance, and error term eI . Out-of-pocket medical 
expenses are assumed to be zero in the insured state. 
 
An individual will enroll if  UI(YI,P; Ts) - UN (YN, M; Tw) > eN – eI. The difference is a linear 
function of Y, P, M and the difference in tastes for coverage, Ts, and TW. Thus 
 
Enrolment = f ( Y,P,M, Pf) 
   13
Where Pf = Ts – TW and denotes individual preference. Assuming (eN – eI) to be logistically 
distributed, coefficient estimates will be derived from logit estimates of the likelihood of 
enrollment. 
 
Theories of optimal risk taking behavior suggest that households which are more likely to 
face vulnerability exhibit a higher coefficient of risk aversion (Lin 2009) and hence greater 
preference for insurance. In the above model, Y represents economic vulnerabilities (income, 
wealth, income sources) while M is a function of health related vulnerabilities (age and 
family health background, sanitaition conditoions, natural calamities). Individual preference 
are determined by socio-cultural and location specific factors. Socio-cultural factors cover, 
social vulnerabilities (such as social exclusion, lack of education, poor access to information, 
gender bias); and family size. Location specific factors on the other hand cover locational 
vulnerabilities (health and transport infrastructure); presence of cooperative societies; and the 
quality of governance. Thus, our model is 
 
Enrolement = f (E (.), H (.),G (.), S (.), L(.), Z(.))….......(1) 
where E, H, G, S, and L represent economic, health, gender specific and locational 
vulnerabilities, respectively; and Z represents other variables represnting individual 
preferences. The same set of factors is also likely to influence renewals and the utilisation of 
health care services. Besley (1989) argues that just as demand for health services is derived 
from demand for health, demand for health insurance is derived from demand for health 
services. Thus the same set of factors is expected to affect the utilisation of health care and 
health insurance. 
   14
Commercial health insurance cannot result in socially optimal distribution of insurance and is 
found to be negatively related with vulnerabilities. Our major hypothesis here is that micro 
insurance removes obstacles to obtaining health insurance coverage for the vulnerable 
population and hence is positively related with vulnerabilities. The most basic vulnerability is 
the existence of health vulnerability i.e. ill-health, disease, and disability. Commercial 
insurance imposes restrictions on insurance policies in terms of waiting periods, pre-existing 
condition exclusions, and cost sharing requirements that impede consumers in poor health 
from obtaining insurance. CBHI programmes however do not pose any such conditions. A 
second vulnerability arises from economic disadvantage. People with low incomes are 
especially price-sensitive in their purchase of health coverage. Small premiums in CBHI 
programmes however make insurance affordable for the poor. A third type of vulnerability 
arises from race or ethnicity.  In part, the disadvantages associated with race or ethnicity are 
due to poverty and low income. Yet, potential discrimination based on race/ethnicity can also 
pose complex barriers to insurance coverage. Socially vulnerable groups such as women, and 
people with low education and poor access to information may also face important barriers to 
effective and informed decision-making. CBHI in particular Yeshasini operates at the 
grassroot level and involves cashless transctions to remove such obstacles. Finally, locational 
vulnerabilities such as poor health and transport infrastructure make people vulnerable to 
catastrophic shocks. A sparse supply causes inequity in access to services but at the same 
time insufficient supply of health services may well be an inefficient reaction to insufficient 
demand. Weak demand may not be linked with slight ability to pay but due to the prevalence 
of barter transactions in a predominantly monetised economy. Microinsurance has the 
potential of breaking this vicious circle by generating demand for health care, which, in turn, 
could improve supply (Dror and Jacquier, 1999). As seen above, Yeshasvini has large 
membership base with vast network of health service providers spread across the state.   15
Finally, the programme’s success in building the atmosphere of trust and transparency is 
expected to have contributed to the willing to pay by the poor. Thus, we hypothesise that a 
large community based insurance programme offers a viable insurance option for the 
vunerable population.  
 
5. Model Estimation and database 
 
In an attempt to estimate Model (1), we express both dependent and independent variables in 




Enrolment = 1, if a atleast one memberof the household is enrolled with the programme 
                   = 0, otherwise; 
Renewal = 1 if at leastone member of the household has been member of the programme for 
the pat three years 
               = 0 otherwise; 
Claimant/Beneficiary= 1 if at least one member of the household has claimed benefit in the 
past three years. 




Economic vulnerabilities: Economic vulnerabilities are captured by the following income 
related variables:   16
 
Annual income (annual_inc) : Annual household income 
 
Concen_inc : HH index of concentration of income sources 
 
Household wealth indices (hh_wealth) : Wealth indices based on ownership of assets were 
generated using principal components analysis. 
 
Health vulnerabilities: The likelihood of a health shock may vary systematically with observable 
characteristics, such as age, prevalence of chronic health problems, and ecological and sanitation 
conditions in the surroundings in which households live. Age is captured by two variables: 
Headage: Age of the head of the family 
Age_dividend: proportion of household members in the working age group. 
 
The prevalence of chronic health problem is represented by a dummy, 
chron_health: =1 if at least one member is suffering from chronic health problem. 
                        =0, otherwise. 
Ecological and sanitation conditions are proxied by,   
 
V_wat_san: Index of living conditions (measured by principle component analysis) ,and  
 
V_Naturalcdn: No. of beneficiaries of natural disaster  as percentage of total population 
 
Gender vulnerability Sh_female: Share of female members in the household 
   17
Social vulnerability:     These are captured by the following variables 
 
 SC_group:   =1 if belongs to SC/ST 
                     =0, otherwise 
Aveduyears:   average education years of the household 
Access_TV: regularity of watching TV on likert scale of 1 to 4 
Access_Paper : regularity of reading newspaper on likert scale of 1 to 4.  
Membershg: =1 if member of Self help groups (SHGs) 
                     =0 otherwise 
 
 Locational vulnerabilities: Village specific, and district specific health attributes along with 
household specific characteristics are used in the study to capture locational vulnerability. 
They include health infrastructure, distance from the nearest health facility, and distance from 
the nearest yeshasvini facility, prevalence of natural calamities, and water and sanitation 
conditions. 
V-hlthinfra : Index of health facilities created using the principal component analysis (PCA) 
V-hlthdistance: Distance from the nearest health facility 
Y-dist : distance of the nearest Yeshasvini facility 
D_ healthinfra : Index of the quality of district level health infrastructure 
D-tpt: PCA based index of district level transport facilities 
 
Control variables:  
Size: Household size 
D_R_f_rat : rural female literacy rates 
D_f_m_gp: female membership gram panchayats as ratio of total members   18
V_copop  : cooperative societies per capita 
D_pcy : per capita income at the district level 
 
In general,  the model is specified as: 
Z = β X + U  
where Ui is a stochastic error term.  The models estimated are of discrete choice type, which 
explain the probability that a person chooses to enroll, renew membership and utilize the 
programme benefits in alternative specifications, in terms of  the variables representing 
household specific characteristics, and  the socio-economic-health environment in which the 
population lives. Logit regression methods were employed for estimation of the specified 
functions. The binary logistic regression model is stated in terms of the probability that Y=l given X.: 
 
The probability that the household is member/claimant is given by: 
 
Probi = Pr [P0i = 1\Xi] =Pr [Ui<β1Xi] = θ [1-β1Xi 
Where X = a vector containing all the independent variables.  
 
Secondary and primary data sources were used to create a database for the study. The 
database contained three levels of hierarchy: district level; village level and the household 
level.  
 
Household data: Primary data were collected through fully structured household 
questionnaires in 82 villages drawn from a sample of 16 districts in Karnataka. A total of 
4109 households were interviewed during the months of December 2007 to May 2008. A 
multi-stage stratified design was adopted for the survey for deriving the coverage.     19
 
Village level data: The village level information was collected through primary and 
secondary sources. The ‘Department of Rural Development and Panchayat Raj’ maintains 
vast information system on the basic amenities available in the villages of Karnataka.   We 
compiled this information for 82 sample villages. This was supplemented with the primary 
data collected from 82 sample villages.  
 
District level information: At the district level, information was collected from various 
government departments.  These included, the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, the 
‘Planning and Statistics Department’ and the office of the Registrar of Cooperative Societies 
of the Government of Karnataka.  
 
6. Empirical findings 
 
Our household sample comprised of two broad groups of households: cooperative households 
(CH); and non cooperative households (NCH). A pertinent question was whether the 
representative sample should comprise of only the eligible (cooperative) households or the 
full sample. The argument in favour of the former is that the programme covers only 
cooperative households and therefore the impact of the factors affecting membership can be 
more meaningfully captured by the regression based on the censored sample. However, the 
participation in cooperative societies itself is voluntary, the possibility of unobservable self 
selection bias could not therefore be ruled out.  Any regression based only on the sample of 
cooperative members will not capture the systematic difference between the two groups. If 
the regression is based only on the cooperative households then it is necessary to adjust it for 
the selection bias. Since we do not have any idea of the bias involved, we used both, the   20
censored and the full sample in alternative specifications.  The logit model estimations show 
a relatively good fit of the model, expressed by Chi-squared statistics in both the 
specifications (Table 2). The results are also found to be consistent and stable. In what 
follows, we discuss the results. 
Gender equity: Our logistic regressions reveal that the probability of enrolling into the CBHI 
scheme was gender neutral. The variable Sh_Female turns insignificant in all the 
specifications of enrollment (including renewals). This indicates that the programme offers 
equal access to health care services to all irrespective of the gender. Interestingly however, 
the variable turns positive and significant in the estimation of beneficiaries’ function 
indicating that the women are likely to be the major beneficiaries of the programme. The 
programme has gender positive effects in terms of the distribution of benefits.  
Evidence suggests that in developing countries females are more susceptible to illness than 
men. Nutritional status of women and girls is compromised by unequal access to food, by 
heavy work demands, and by special nutritional needs (such as for iron). Furthermore, they 
are often trapped in a cycle of ill health exacerbated by childbearing, exposure to heavy 
smoke from kitchen fires, and hard physical labor, especially in agricultural areas. Despite 
their serious health problems they do not get adequate levels of preventive care. The 
consequences of women's unfavorable status in inherently inequitable social system prevalent 
in most developing countries include discrimination in the allocation of household resources, 
such as food, health care and education. Women's health and nutritional status is thus 
inextricably bound up with social, cultural, and economic factors that influence all aspects of 
their lives. Therefore, women comprise the key stakeholders in health policy debates and are 
the most vulnerable section of the society. The focus of any social health insurance scheme 
should therefore be to ensure that the scheme provided is just as attractive to women as it is to   21
the men and that it is effective in attracting their participation and providing health access.  
The Yeshasvini health care programme is an opportunity for the rural women to access 
quality health care services at low contribution.  
Social equity: While the programme is equitable in terms of female participation, it is 
inequitable among different social groups. After controlling for the socio economic 
characteristics of households, H_SC turned significant with a negative sign in all the 
specifications of enrolment, renewal of enrolment and utilisation after controlling for other 
household and location specific characteristics. This implies that there is a problem of social 
exclusion in enrollment and utilisation. The programme enrollment is biased in favour of the 
empowered classes of the society. Since independence, there has been political and social 
mobilisation of SCs in India. However, this mobilisation has failed to translate into positive 
change in the social sector for this excluded population. This is reflected in the enrollment 
process of the programme. 
Education, access to information (access_tv, access-paper) and membership of self help 
groups, are found to be empowering factors that increase the likelihood of joining the 
programme and renewing membership. Thus the population groups that suffer from social 
vulnerabilities in terms of lack of education, access to information and community groups 
have lower probability of joining the programme. The programme is socially inequitable in 
that sense.  
 
Utilisation of the programme however is influenced only by the levels of education; other 
variables are not significant. Thus, social inequities are less skewed in terms of the 
distribution of benefits.   22
Economic equity: Enrollment into the programme and renewal of enrolment, both are found 
to be inequitable in economic terms as well. The variable hholdasset is significant with a 
positive sign in all the specification of the logit model indicating that enrolment remains 
disproportionately in favour of the wealthier classes. Income turns insignificant though. 
Interestingly, both income and wealth related factors turned insignificant in the beneficiaries’ 
equation. This means that there are no significant differences in the income levels of 
yeshasvini beneficiaries and non beneficiaries. Apparently, while a well off household is 
more likely to become a member, a beneficiary is not necessarily economically better off than 
his non Y-member counterpart seeking surgery. Most studies while analysing financial 
protection aspect of CBHI focus on membership and its relationship with income, and on 
finding a positive relationship between income and the probability of becoming a member 
conclude that the scheme does not reach the vulnerable. Our analysis also finds a positive 
relationship between income and the probability of enrolment. However, it reveals at the 
same time that benefits, which represent an outcome of membership, do not necessarily go to 
wealthier households.  
 
Health equity: chron_health also turns significant in all the equations. This implies that 
poorer the health status of household members, the greater is the likelihood of the household 
to join the programme. Technically, this is termed as ‘adverse selection’. But in practice, the 
objective of the scheme is to provide equitable access to health care on the basis of need; if 
people with the greatest needs are joining the scheme and increasing their use of services that 
is consistent with this objective of equity. However, this raises concerns about the future 
sustainability of the programme. Health service utilisation increases with age, a commonly 
reported finding. As age increases, there is increasing likelihood of experiencing an episode   23
of ill-health, and this greater health need accounts for the increased levels of utilisation 
among individuals aged over 60.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Locational equity: Location- specific vulnerabilities are expected to increase risk aversion. 
Insurance therefore can promote locational equity. Our analysis shows that both, the 
membership and the renewal of membership, are positively related with locational 
vulnerabilities as represented by D-hlthinfra and V_naturalcdn. Thus, the households located 
in districts with poor government health infrastructure are more likely to join the programme. 
Location specific natural disadvantages also affect individual preferences to enroll with the 
programme. This implies that the programme is doing well in reaching the areas where 
government health facilities are poor and the probability of natural calamity is higher. The 
programme is thus covering the most vulnerable groups of the rural population and to that 
extent, it is equitable. However, enrolment into the programme ( current and renewals) is 
found to be  negatively related with poverty, poor living conditions, and distances from the 
government health care facilities and is positively related with transport facilities. By 
disproportionately favouring the people in better off villages and districts it exacerbates 
inequities. Thus the net effects of the enrolment into the programme on locational 
vulnerabilities remain uncertain. When viewed from the perspective of beneficiaries however, 
the programme is neutral with regard to locational vulnerabilities. It does not 
disproportionately favour the people in well off districts. Clearly the programme is more 




This study analyses whether micro health insurance programmes can serve as an effective 
instrument in providing health security to the most vulnerable sections of the society. More 
specifically it examines how equitable is enrolment, renewal, and utilisation of community-
based health insurance? While doing so, it focuses on one of the largest and the most 
innovative CBHI programmes in India: Yeshasvini health care programme. Data was 
collected using a questionnaire that was administered to 4109 respondents in rural Karnataka 
selected by stratified random sampling. Our results based on logit models reveal that while   24
enrolment and renewal of enrolment are inequitable, there is little inequity in utilisation of 
services.  
 
Yeshasvini is one of the most innovative and successful CBHI programmes in India. It has 
the potential to increase access of the most vulnerable groups of the population to health care 
and provide them financial protection (Aggarwal 2010). But nevertheless, it could not fully 
resolve the issue of equality. In general, one can suggest that efforts need to be made to 
increase the number of enrolees, so as to increase the pool of funds and risks. Information 
dissemination is an important aspect of the scheme. A well designed marketing package may 
be employed to promote enrolment and renewal of enrolment. Besides, strategies should be 
adopted to increase levels of trust by improving  
  quality of care (through strategic purchasing);  
  transparency and accountability among those managing the scheme;  
  recourse to justice to punish fraud; and  
  community participation in the programme management. 
 
More importantly however, it indicates that CBHI programmes are useful in themselves, but 
no substitute for hospitals and hospital networks that can respond to the needs of the most 
vulnerable sections of the population. The National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) was 
launched in 2005 by the Government in India to improve the availability of and access to 
quality healthcare by people, especially for the vulnerable population. An early impact 
evaluation of the programme (Gill,2009) however indicates that there are many problems in 
its implementation, so that delivery is far from what is ought to be. These problems need to 
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Table 1: Patterns of claimants by district and hospital (2004-07) 








2004-05  14.87 33.38 47.92 670.5 27 
2005-06  13.13 29.76 42.53   27 
2006-07  11.54 25.43 37.35 323.2 27 
Hospital city 
2004-05  27.12 50.80 69.70 1417.7  60 
2005-06  24.76 40.43 53.98   60 
2006-07  23.87 37.34 48.07 829.5 79 
Hosp Name 
2004-05  9.81  17.94 24.78 254.1 148 
2005-06  12.59 22.13 28.30   160 
2006-07  10.74 19.48 26.03 230.3 290 





Table 2: Logit estimations of the probability of enrolling, renewing and utilizing the 
programme  
  Sample of Cooperative households  Full sample 
Variable Enrolment  Renewal  of 
membership
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Yesh_dis     -0.00782
 c
(-1.87)







































































































LR statistics  229.56 177.78 36.14 444.16 296.01 49.57
NOB  2756 2756 395 3772 3772 483
 